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Abstract
A psychophysical experiment was run to scale brightness.
Two types of responses were employed — simple reaction times
and magnitude estimates. In one condition reaction times
and magnitude estimates were recorded simultaneously for
each stimulus presentation. In the other condition, reaction
times and magnitude estimates were recorded separately in
successive series of stimulus presentations.
Reaction times in the simultaneous condition were ad-
versely affected by what appeared to be competing sets for
performing the two tasks, while magnitude estimates were
found to be a power function of stimulus intensity.
In the successive condition reaction times were found
to be a negative logarithmic function of stimulus intensity.
However, unlike the reaction times, magnitude estimates
were found to be a power function of stimulus intensity.
The results were interpreted as lending support to a
two-stage model of psychophysical processing similar to
that proposed by Ekman (1964) and Treisman (1964a, b).
Methodological considerations for psychophysical scaling
were discussed, and it was proposed that the Fechner-
Stevens controversy is really a pseudo-controversy.
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REACTION TIME, MAGNITUDE ESTIMATES, AND THE
PSYCHOPHYSICAL LAW
ARMAND VINCENT CARDELLO
Psychophysics, as conceived by its founder, Gustav
Theodore Fechner, is "the exact science of the function-
ally dependent relations of body and soul or, more general-
ly of the material and the mental, of the physical and
the psychological worlds" (Fechner, 1860, p.7). As such,
one primary task of psychophysics is the determination
of the mathematical relationship between the magnitude of
sensations and the intensity of the physical stimuli which
arouse them. This relationship can be stated in the form
V = f (0) (1)
where V is the sensation magnitude aroused by the stim-
ulus, and 0 is the physical intensity of the stimulus.
Over the past century, two forms of this psychophysi-
cal function have been proposed. The first was proposed
by Fechner in 1850 and maintains that sensation magnitude
increases as a logarithmic function of stimulus intensity:
V - k log 0. The second was proposed by Plateau in 1872
and was recently revived by Stevens (1957). It maintains
that sensation magnitude increases as a power function
of stimulus intensity: V = k 0n , where n is a constant
that depends on the sensory modality investigated. The
major controversy in psychophysical scaling for the past
15 years has been concerned with which of these two is
the "correct" form of the psychophysical law.
Fechner 1 s Law
According to Boring (1957, PP. 275-277), Gustav
Pechner was trained early in medicine and physics, but later
became possessed by the 19th century "philosophy of nature."
This philosophy attempted to demonstrate the spiritual mean-
ing prevalent within nature, and led Fechner to the belief
that mind and matter were two aspects of the same reality.
This panpsychism, coupled with his training in the physical
and biological sciences, was the impetus for him to begin the
task of applying quantitative scientific methods to the study
of mind, Fechner was convinced that if he could describe a
mathematical relationship between mind and matter, this would,
serve to vindicate his metaphysical contentions.
Having worked with Weber at the University of Leipzig,
Fechner was well aware of the relationship which Weber had
discovered between the size of the difference threshold and
the absolute intensity at which it is determined. This rela-
tionship, which Fechner later termed "Weber's Law," states
that the increase in the intensity of a stimulus necessary to
establish a just noticeable difference (j.n.d.) in sensation i
a constant fraction of the absolute intensity of the stimulus,
~^f- = k (2)
where 0 is the absolute intensity of the stimulus, is
the change in intensity necessary for a j.n.d., and k is
a constant, between zero and one.
3Fechner believed that Weber's Law was essentially
correct and that it could serve as a starting point
for the establishment of a psychophysical law relating
sensation magnitude (mind) to stimulus magnitude (matter).
However, in its original form, Weber's Law relates only
physical variables, as 0 and „&0 are objective measures
of the stimulus. In order to establish a function in
the form of Equation (1), a psychological variable must
be introduced. Fechner pondered this problem and the
solution presented itself to him "as he lay abed on Oct-
ober 22, 1850" (Stevens, 196la, p. 80). His solution
required the assumption that all j-n.d.'s are equal,
regardless of the absolute value of the stimulus level
at which they are determined* This assumption, which
was later termed ''Fechner 's conjecture" by his critics,
has been the target of most of the criticism aimed at
his derivation of the psychophysical law. However, the
important aspect of the assumption is that it allows for
the necessary psychological variable to be introduced into
the equation. For it follows that, if all j.n.d. 's are
equal, and if a j.n.d. is described by Weber's Law, then
AY=c^L (3)
where 0 is the intensity of the stimulus, A0 is the in-
crease in the intensity of the stimulus necessary for a
j.n.d., AVis a j.n.d., and c is a constant of proportion-
ality. Fechner termed Equation (3) the "fundamental
formula," and working with it, carried out a strictly
mathematical derivation to arrive at his psychophysical
law. The first step was to assume that differentials
could be substituted for the differences in the equation.
The second step involved the integration of this modified
fundamental formula between stimulus threshold (0 ) and
any possible physical intensity (0). This is expressed
mathematically as
or after integration,
V = c log 0 + C (Zf
)
where V is the sensation magnitude, 0 is the intensity
of the stimulus, C is a constant of integration, and c
is a constant of proportionality. Fechner termed Equation
(*0 the "measurement formula" and it is in the form required
by Equation (1). However, Fechner wanted to eliminate
the unknown constant of integration. He accomplished this
by assuming that the sensation magnitude experienced at
stimulus threshold is zero, therefore
c log 0Q + C = 0
or
C = -c log 0Q . (5)
'When the value for C from Equation (5) is substituted in-
to Equation (4), the result is
V = c log 0 - c log 0,
which reduces to
<+> = c log -4- . (6)
5
If the stimulus intensity at threshold is taken as the
unit of stimulus measure, Equation (6) further reduces
to
V c log 0 (7)
which is the form of the equation that is most commonly
known as "Fechner's Law."
Fechner's derivation of the law has been criticized
for various reasons, some more valid than others. First
is the fact that Fechner assumed Weber's Law to be true.
Although it has been well confirmed that Weber's Law I
holds for the mid-range of stimulus intensities, the
relationship breaks down at both very high and very low
intensities (Woodworth and Schlosberg, 1956). At these
extremes the difference threshold becomes larger than
would be predicted by Weber's Law as determined in the
raid-range. These systematic departures from the law led
some investigators to propose alternative formulations.
Thus, Fullerton and Cattell (1892) proposed that differ-
ence thresholds increase in proportion to the square
root of the stimulus, i.e.^0 = c>J 0 , while Guilford
(1932) proposed that difference thresholds increase in
proportion to a power of the stimulus, i.e.A0 = c 0n ,
These new formulations proved to be either no more ac-
curate than Weber's Law itself, or were so general as to
be trivial. It seems that Weber's Lav/ as originally
stated in Equation (2) is a good description of the re-
lationship for the greater part of the stimulus range
(Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1956; Savage, 1970).
The second and most important criticism of Fechner's
derivation is that it is based on the assumption that
J.n.d.'s are equal. This criticism is well deserved,
for it is, indeed, only an assumption. There is no a
priori reason for its acceptance, and the only empirical
evidence which could be brought to bear on the truth of
the assumption would necessarily require some already ex-
isting measure of sensation. There is no obvious reason
why Fechner did not merely assume that Weber's Law held
for both physical and psychological magnitudes." This
assumption would have led to a new "fundamental formula
jf y , the mathematical development of which entails
a psychophysical power law.
A third criticism of Fechner lies in the validity
of his integration of the fundamental formula. In order
to apply the calculus to Equation (3), a0 and a¥ must
become infinitesimal (approach 6.0 and dV ). This poses
no problem as it relates to 6.0, because one can conceive
of an infinitesimal change in a physical intensity. How-
ever, it is very unclear as to what d^
,
an infinitesimal
change in sensation, can represent. By definition, aV
is the sensation difference which is just large enough
to be noticeable* Any difference less than aV would mean
it is not noticeable, and therefore, not a sensation dif-
ference at all. Although this criticism bears truth, it
is not crucial to the derivation of the logarithmic law.
7The Fechnerian relationship can also be established by
using discrete steps of sensation, as will be seen below.
Given Fechner's Law, the question arises as to the
empirical evidence which supports it. Fechner's own method
for empirical verification was that of "summing j.n.d.'s."
In this method the stimulus threshold is first determined
by one of the classical psychophysical methods, and this
stimulus intensity is assigned a sensation value of zero
(0.0). Then the intensity which is just noticeably greater
than threshold intensity is determined and assigned a sensa-
tion value of one (1.0). Likewise, the next just noticeably
greater intensity is determined and assigned a sensation
value of two (2.0). As each j.n.d. is determined one
sensation unit is added to the total. Thus each j.n.d.
represents an equal sensation unit, and the sum total of
j.n.d.'s which comprise any particular stimulus intensity
is taken as the sensation value for that stimulus. When
the sensation value determined in this manner is plotted
against the intensity of the stimulus, the resultant func-
tion is a logarithmic one. This method, although confirming
Fechner's Law, also demonstrates its greatest weakness.
The method of summing j.n.d.'s directly measures only
physical variables, i.e. the 0's and z\0*s of Weber's Law.
At no time are sensations directly measured. The sensa-
tion values are assigned by the experimenter on the assump-
tion that each j.n.d. is equivalent to one sensation unit.
8The claim that Fechner's methodology is indirect, and
therefore without validity, has been championed by S.S.
Stevens in his "repeal" of Fechner's Law (Stevens, 196la).
S Sevens | Law
One practical outcome of Fechner's Law was the devel-
opment of a logarithmic scale of auditory intensities —
the decibel scale. This scale was employed for the con-
venience of having a scale of intensity which is propor-
tional to the scale of loudness. If Fechner's Law were
correct, a tone of lOOdB would sound twice as loud as a
tone of 50 dB. In point of fact, a tone of 100 dB sounds
forty times as loud as one of 50 dB (Stevens, 1970a).
This discrepancy indicated that there was something wrong
with the logarithmic law.
Aware of this discrepancy and employed to determine
an alternative scale of loudness, S.S. Stevens began a
career-long inquiry into psychophysical scaling. Trained
in the philosophy of measurement, he established a hier-
archy of scales defined by the mathematical transformations
that leave the scale form invariant (Stevens, 1951). This
hierarchy proceeds from the simplest scale, nominal, to
those of ordinal, interval and ratio. The ratio scale
affords the greatest amount of information regarding the
relationships among the measured entities, as it mathemat-
ically subsumes each of the other scales. For this reason,
Stevens proposed that ratio scales be used in the measurement
9of sensation. The decision to use ratio scaling, coupled
with the objection that Fechner's method of summing j.n.d.'s
was indirect, led Stevens to the use of bisection and frac-
tionation methods of scaling loudness. These methods re-
quire the subject to directly estimate the stimulus intensity
which appears one-half (one-third, twice, three times,
etc.) as loud as another stimulus. (It should be pointed
out that a form of ratio scaling had been used much earlier
by Merkel (1888), but little came of the method.) The
results of these ratio scaling procedures led to the devel-
opment of the "sone" scale of loudness (Stevens, 1936).
This scale proved to be non-linearly related to the decibel
scale and suggested a power function between subjective
loudness and sound intensity. Convinced that his methodology
was correct, Stevens began a search for other direct ratio
methods. In 1953, as a result of a rather trite comment
made during a coffee-break at the Harvard Psycho-acoustics
Laboratory, Stevens struck upon his solution. Richard
Held, a colleague, commented that Stevens treated his
subjects as though they had a built-in loudness scale from
which they could read off values, as though from an instru-
ment. This conception led Stevens to allow subjects to
assign their own internal numbers to represent the magni-
tude of their sensations, and he termed the method "mag-
nitude estimations" (Stevens, 1970b).
The results from magnitude estimation and subsequent
direct ratio scaling methods (magnitude production, ratio
10
production, ratio estimation) led Stevens to the rediscov-
ery of Plateau's power law. Stevens maintained that on
scores of psychological continua, direct ratio methods
indicated that sensation grows as a power function of stim-
ulus intensity (Stevens, 1957). This relationship is ex-
pressed mathematically as
V = e 0
n
(8)
where V is the sensation magnitude, 0 is the intensity of
the stimulus, n is the exponent of the power function,
and c is a constant of proportionality. Furthermore,
the exponent of the power function is an invariant char-
acteristic of the sensory continuum being measured, and
is directly related to the transduction of energy which
takes place at the end-organ (Stevens, 196lb, 19?0a).
Stevens (196lb) has stated his formulation more
generally as
V = c (0 - 0Q )
n
(9)
to include a correction factor. This correction factor,
0Q , is the intensity at stimulus threshold. It is sub-
tracted from the stimulus intensity being measured so as
to correct for differences in stimulus thresholds among
sensory continua. The assumption underlying this correc-
tion factor is that the effective stimulus is only that
portion of the intensity which is above threshold. For
most sensory continua and ranges of stimuli, this correc-
tion factor has negligible effect. It is only at very low
intensities or when the sensory system is adapted to supra-
11
threshold levels that the threshold parameter becomes an
important factor. Thus, Equation (9) is the general
form of the power law, and it has often been termed
"Stevens' Law.
"
Having formulated his psychophysical law, Stevens
returned to the question that Fechner had raised, as to
whether j.n.d.'s were equal. His conclusion was that Fech-
ner 1 s assumption was certainly wrong and that equal stim-
ulus ratios do not produce equal sensation differences as
is indicated in Equation (3). Rather, equal stimulus ratios
produce equal sensation ratios, ^%^=
,
because when
this equation is integrated, it results in the psychophysi-
cal power law.
It is important to note that Fechner' s critics
object to his derivation of the psychophysical law on the
grounds that it is based on an assumption that may or may
not be true; however, the same critics often fail to
point out that Stevens' derivation also relies on an as-
sumption. The assumption that Stevens makes is not directly
stated, but can be inferred from the method by which his
law was derived. This assumption is that direct ratio
procedures actually measure sensation magnitudes. This
basic assumption is as important to an analysis of the
power law as the assumption of equal j.n.d.'s is to an
analysis of the logarithmic law; yet the only "empirical"
evidence which Stevens has presented to support the face
12
validity of his procedures are subjects' verbal reports
that "they feel certain that they are gauging the strength
or intensity of their sensations" (Stevens, 1964, p. 383).
The question of the validity of Stevens* direct ratio
methods has been brought to the forefront by Garner (1953,
195*0, Attneave (1962), Ekman (1964) and Treisman (i960,
1964a, b). These investigators argue that Stevens' methods
are not nearly as direct as he claims, but that the power
law is an artifact of the use of numbers as a response
mode. Instead, they propose a two-stage model of psycho-
physical processing to explain the results of magnitude
estimation methods and related ratio procedures. The first
or input stage involves a transduction of the stimulus
intensity (0) into a sensation magnitude (V). However,
the second or output stage transduces this sensation mag-
nitude into a numerical value which is then given as the
response (R ) . One can see from this schema that if Ste-
vens contends that the power law transformation enters
into the system at the end-organ, then he must assume
linearity both in the central nervous system and in the
effector system. What Garner, Attneave, Ekman, and Treis-
man have argued is that the output stage need not be linear.
If it is not, then the fact that R is a power function
of 0 tells us nothing about the relationship between V
and 0* They propose that Stevens' power function really
relates R to 0 and is, therefore, a result of compounding
the input and output functions. Garner and Attneave contend
13
that these two functions are power functions. Mathemati-
cally stated, their contention is if V = 0m and R =^ n
then R = 0mn
,
where 0 is the stimulus intensity, V is
th3 sensation magnitude, R is the response magnitude and
m and n are the exponents of the power functions. It is
clear that this model entails that the exponents of
Stevens' power functions are really composed of two mul-
tiplicative factors, one for the input stage and one for
the output stage, and that the exponent of interest for
relating sensation magnitude ( V ) to stimulus intensity
(>>) is only that of the input stage. Ekman and Treisman
have argued along similar lines, but contend that Stevens'
power function results from a logarithmic input function
and an exponential output function. Kathematically stated,
their contention is if ^ = m log 0 and R = e then R =
0
n
,
where 0 is the stimulus intensity, V is the sensation
magnitude, R is the response magnitude, e is the base of
natural logarithms, m is a constant of proportionality,
and n is the exponent of the power function. Thus, their
rjodol assumes the accuracy of Fechner's Law as a descrip-
tion of the relationship between H; and 0.
Stevens (196^) has countered the above arguments with
the statement that the critics are dealing with intervening
variables that cannot be measured. He asserts that the
only observables in the situation are the stimulus input
and the numerical response output, and that these are re-
lated by a power function. Stevens might, indeed, be
Ik
correct in his rebuttal of the two-stage models on these
grounds; however, the criticism concerning the peculiarity
of the numerical response mode has not been met. Recent
evidence (Rule, 1969, 1971, 1972; Rule & Curtis, 1973)
indicates that subjects 1 subjective numbers are a negatively
accelerated function of objective number. In a further
effort to repudiate this adverse criticism, Stevens (1964,
1966, 1969) has cited the results of cross-modality matching
studies. In this procedure the subject matches an inten-
sity on one stimulus continuum to an intensity on another
stimulus continuum. Here numbers are not used at all,
yet prediction of the results can be made from knowledge
of the exponents of the power functions governing the two
matched continua. If the function governing the growth
of sensation on one continuum is known from magnitude es-
timation to be Va= 0a and that for the other continuum
is known to be <+'ti= $b » then ifhen the psychological mag-
nitudes are matched, we should get
This equation can be rewritten
log 0a
- log 0b (11)
which states that the exponent of the equal sensation
function is given by the ratio -~ of the exponents of
the two matched continua. The fact that this relationship
has been confirmed empirically by cross-modality matching
experiments led Stevens to accept this method as evidence
for the veracity of his power lav;. In fact, Stevens'
15
enthusiasm for this method has motivated him to declare
that "the procedure of magnitude estimation is actually
a form of cross-modality matching in which numbers are
mrtched to stimuli" (Stevens, 1971, p. 428). However,
by subjugating magnitude estimation to a form of cross-
modality matching, Stevens has reduced the empirically
determined absolute values of the exponents to merely
relative values. This is a result of the closing of a
methodological circle by which each sensory continuum is
used to measure each other sensory continuum. The result-
ant exponents are then only relative to the particular
continuum used to derive them. Furthermore, both Treis-
man (1964b) and Savage (1970) point out that Equation (11)
can also be deduced if the growth of sensation for both
oontinua follows a logarithmic law, even though the ex-
ponent in this case is an arbitrary constant.
A. still more general criticism of Stevensonian psycho-
physics has been raised by Warren (1958) and Warren and
Warren (1958). They claim that the psychophysical power
law does not describe the input-output operating character-
istics of the sensory system, but that it describes learned
relationships among stimuli. This "learning hypothesis"
contends that as a child, the subject has learned the rules
for assigning numbers to stimuli by observing the relation-
ships between physical stimuli and some other physical
attribute associated with the stimuli - such as distance.
16
For example, a child will learn to call an object of a
certain brightness one-half as bright when it is moved
twice the distance away from a point source. However,
by the inverse square law, the actual luminance is £ of
its original value. This mismatch results in the child
learning that brightness increases by the function V = 00 *-5 .
Likewise, in cross
-modality matching, it is contended
that the subjects are matching two continua as they would
appear if moved equal distances from their sources. If
this analysis is correct, both magnitude estimation and
cross-modality matching describe the learned relationship
among stimulus intensities, and not the operating character-
istics of the sensory system. However, the relative sparsi-
ty of point sources in the normal environment, along with
the roundabout nature of the purported learning, casts
doubt on the cogency of this theory.
To summarize the review up to this point, we have
seen that both Fechner's Law and Stevens* Law are based
on assumptions. In the former case it is the assumption
that j.n.d. 's are equal, while in the latter case it is
the assumption that the ratio methods directly measure
sensations. Furthermore we have seen that each "lat*" has
the support of empirical data behi>id it. For Fechner's
Law it is the data resulting from the method of summing
j.n.d. 's, while for Stevens' Law it is the data resulting
from the methods of direct ratio scaling. In this regard,
17
it has been pointed out by Phillips (1964) that it is
logically consistent that two different psychophysical
functions have been generated by two so greatly different
methodologies. For this reason, the controversy over the
correct psychophysical function can be seen to parallel
those between the specificity and the neural interpreta- I
tion theories of sensory coding and the telephone and
place theories of hearing (Dzendolet, 1969). Lastly, it
has been shown that both methodologies can be criticized
on very important grounds. Therefore, the question arises
a3 to what other empirical evidence can be brought to
bear on the problem of discriminating between the two
psychophysical laws.
Evidence from Partition Scaling
The first line of evidence to be considered is the
result of partition scaling methods. Partition scales
are those that require the subject to divide a segment
of the continuum into a finite number of equally spaced
categories. Partition scales were first employed by Plat-
eau, when he asked various artists to paint a shade of
gray which would divide the sensation distance between
a patch of white and a patch of black into two equal parts.
The most common method for constructing a partition
scale is the procedure of category scaling. In category scaling
the subject is presented with a series of stimuli, varying
in intensity, i*hich he must place into n equally spaced
18
ana numbered sensation categories (usually seven). He
is instructed to place the weakest stimulus into category 1
and the strongest stimulus into category 7, with intermedi-
ate stimuli distributed in such a way that the intervals
between categories are subjectively equal. When the mean
category placement is determined for each stimulus and
plotted against stimulus intensity the results support
a logarithmic function at times, and a power function at
other times, depending upon the stimulus continuum being
scaled. This ambiguity has led Stevens and Galanter (1957)
to distinguish between two types of sensory continua —
prothetic and raetathetic. Prothetic continua are defined
as those "for which discrimination appears to be based
on additive mechanism by which excitation is added to excita-
tion at the physiological level," while metathetic continua
are defined as those "for which discrimination behaves
as though based on a substitutive mechanism at the physio-
logical level" (Stevens and Galanter, 1957, p. 377).
Prothetic continua (such as brightness and loudness)
produce category scales which are concave downward relative
to ratio scales, whereas metathetic continua (such as pitch
and position) produce category scales that are linearly
related to ratio scales. Stevens (1957) argues that the
chief factor resulting in the non-linearity of the scales
on the prothetic continua ia a discrimination bias on the
part of the subject, caused by the subject's variation
in sensitivity to differences. Since the subject discriminates
19
better at the lower end of the continuum than at the high-
er end, his ability to tell one magnitude from another
varies over the scale and affects the width of his cate-
gories. Since this bias is not present on metathetic
continua, the category scale is linearly related to the
ratio scale. This explanation has been criticized by
Treisman (1964a) on the ground that there is no reason
why this bias should not affect the direct ratio methods
in the same way as the partition methods. In any case,
the results of partition scaling support Fechner's Law
on prcthetic continua and Stevens' Law on metathetic
continua. As such partition scales do no provide good
empirical evidence for discriminating between the two laws.
Evidence from Electrophysioloprv
The second line of evidence to be considered is the
result of electrophysiological studies of stimulus coding.
When Adrian (1926) demonstrated that stimulus intensity
was coded in the nervous system by the frequency of nerve
impulses, there arose an opportunity to obtain evidence
bearing on the psychophysical law. The first such evidence
came directly from Adrian's laboratory (Adrian and Matthews,
1927). Here it was found that the impulse frequency coming
from the optic nerve of the eel was a logarithmic function
of stimulus intensity. These results were taken as empir-
ical support for the veracity of Fechner's Law. A few
years later Matthews (1931) recorded the impulse frequency
from a muscle spindle in the middle toe of a frog. When
20
the impulse frequency was plotted against the logarithm
of the load, a straight line was produced, indicating
a logarithmic relationship. Hartline and Graham (1932)
performed a similar experiment, but this time recorded
from the nerve fiber emanating from the eccentric cell
of the horseshoe crab (Limulus polyphemus). Their re-
sults also confirmed that spike frequency was a logarithmic
function of stimulus intensity.
These original reports have been followed by a
great number of similar studies which seem to confirm
Fechner's logarithmic law. Galambos and Davis (19^3) and
Tasaki (195^) have reported that the impulse frequency
in single auditory fibers in the guinea pig increases as
a logarithmic function of sound pressure. Katz (1950)
has shown that spike frequency in proprioceptive fibers
of muscle spindles in frogs is a linear function of the
receptor potential, and furthermore, that both of these
physiological measures are logarithmic functions of
stimulus intensity. Granit (1955) has reported that spike
frequency in the lateral line organ of the eel is a log-
arithmic function of the rate of flow of semicircular fluid,
while Rushton (1959) has plotted Fourtes (1959) data from
the Limulus eye and concluded it too, confirms a logarithmic
law. Similar results have been found by Pfaffman, Erick-
son, Frommer, and Halpern (1961) for the integrated pot-
entials from chorda tympani and medulla of rats; by Desmedt
(1962) for the massed response of the cochlear nerve of
21
cats, by DeValois, Jacobs, and Jones (1962) for frequen-
cy of firing of single cells in the lateral geniculate
of monkeys, by Nomoto, Suga and Katsuki (196**) for spike
frequency in the auditory neurons of monkeys, and by
Yamada (1965) for the integrated potentials from the
glassopharyngeal nerve in rats and rabbits.
Recently, however, numerous studies have reported
that certain physiological measures of intensity seem to
be a power function of stimulus intensity. Teas, Eldredge,
and Davis (1962 ) have reported that the amplitude of the
action potential of the auditory nerve in guinea pigs grows
roughly as a power function of sound pressure. Mountcastle,
Poggio and Werner (1963) and Poggio and Mountcastle (1963)
have demonstrated that impulse frequency in single neurons
in the ventrobasal thalamic nuclei of monkeys is a power
function of stimulus intensity (angle of rotation), while
Werner and Mountcastle (1965) have shown the same relation-
ship for the impulse frequency in Iggo touch corpuscle
axons in monkeys. Similar findings have been reported
by Boudreau (1965) for the amplitude of the action poten-
tial in the superior olivary complex of cats, by Vatter
(1966) for the amplitude of visual-evoked potentials in
squirrels, by faster (1968) for impulse frequency in the
ganglion cells of goldfish, and by Dodge, Knight, and
Toyoda (1970) for the amplitude of the generator potential
in the eye of Limulus.
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As is evidenced by this review, until the beginnin,
of the 1960»s, most physiological evidence tended to sup-
port Fechner's Lav/, whereas, after this period the evi-
dence began to shift in favor of Stevens' Law. This led
Stevens (1970b) to the conclusion that early studies did
not find power functions because the investigators were
not looking for them: "So there again, we find Fechner's
logarithmic law guiding the expectations of the physiolo-
gists. Remembering 20 years of my own misdirected atten-
tion, I understand how hard it is to see power functions
wlien you expect a different form" Stevens, 1970a, p. 1046).
Stevens "supported" this claim by replotting the data of
Adrian and Matthews (1927) and Hartline and Graham (1932)
and stating that their data could be fit "equally well"
by power functions. However, Stevens, did not state what
criterion for "equally well" he had employed, i.e., whether
it was. simple visual inspection of the data or some sta-
tistical measure of goodness-of-f it . If it was simple
visual inspection of the data, then Stevens is left open
to exactly the same criticism that he raised against the
early physiologists, for it is entirely possible that
Stevens, and contemporary physiologists also, are looking
for power functions and not logarithmic ones. (As an ex-
ample, in a matter of only three years, DeValois, Jacobs,
and Jones (1965) reversed the decision that their earlier
data (DeValois, et al., 1962) had shown a logarithmic func-
tion and claimed that it now supported a power function.)
.ess-
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If, however, Stevens did calculate a measure of good*
of-fit for these data, then he most certainly should have
published these statistics for the fits of both the log-
ai-ithmic and power function. In this way, it would be
operationally clear what "equally well fit" means. The
lack of such statistical data relegates Stevens" claim
to a mere statement of opinion.
Thus, whatever reasons one might try to postulate
for the peculiar historical development of findings in
physiology, we are left with the conclusion that the data,
taken as a whole, appear to support both Fechner's Law
and Stevens* Law. Furthermore, numerous other studies
have reported neither a logarithmic nor a power function,
but a sigmoid function (see Lipetz, 1971).
So far, we have discussed only those studies in which
animals have served as subjects. Since both Fechner's
Law and Stevens' Law have been formulated to explain the
relationship between stimuli and the sensations aroused
by them in humans, it is surprising that any of the fore-
going data should be accepted as evidence for the validity
of these laws. If these physiological measures correlate
with conscious sensations, then they must certainly be
the sensations of the animals from whom the data were re-
corded. Putting aside the question of whether animals
even have conscious experience, it must still be concluded
that this data is inappropriate for evaluating Fechner's
2k
Law and/or Stevens' Law. The only psychophysical laws
this type of data might be used to support are those that
might evolve from animal behavioral psychophysics a_ la
Blough (1966). However, for those predisposed to making
tne numerous metaphysical assumptions necessary for such
cross-species comparisons, the above animal physiological
data has been presented. For those not so disposed, the
following data may seem more pertinent.
The acceptance of animal physiological data to sup-
port the psychophysical laws has been fostered, in some
pert, by the difficulty of obtaining comparable data from
humans. However, recent studies have made headway in
this area, and if one accepts a psychophysiological paral-
lelism, the results of these studies can be brought to
bear on the problem at hand. Due to the obvious dif-
ficulty of recording directly from the nervous system in
man, most of these studies have employed measures obtained
through external electrodes, most commonly — cortical
evoked potentials (CSR's). Keidel and Spreng (1965)
measured the amplitude of one of the slow components of
the cortical wave to three types of stimuli — tones, elec-
tric current, and vibration. They reported thai; the
responses to all three types of stimuli were power func-
tions of the intensity. Ehrenberger, Finkenzeller, Keidel,
and Plattig (1966) replicated this first study, but used
only vibration as the stimulus. Their results confirmed
the earlier findings. Loewenich and Finkenzeller (1967)
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found that the CER to flashes of light was a power func-
tion of stimulus intensity, while Plattig (196?) found
the CER to electrical stimulation of the tongue to exhibit
the same relationship. Similar results have been found
by David, Bowers, and Hirsh (1968) for the CER to electri-
cal shock to the skin, and by Pranzen and Offenloch (1969)
for the CER to tactile stimulation of the fingers. Although
all of these studies report power functions, even Stevens
(1970a) admits that CER measures are difficult to interpret,
as they represent a summation of neuroelectric potentials
that may have greatly different origins. As such, it is
not clear what stage of stimulus information processing
is being tapped.
A somewhat less ambiguous electrophysiological measure
which has been recorded from humans has produced slightly
different results. Borg, Diamant, Strom, and Zotterman
(1967a, b, 1968) have recorded the summated response in
the chorda tympani of patients undergoing inner ear opera-
tions. Magnitude estimates of the same gustatory stimuli
as used in the experiment were obtained from the same
patients on previous days. Although the magnitude estimates
for salt, sucrose, and acid were fit well by power functions,
the neural data were often fit better by logarithmic func-
tions (Zotterman, 1971). Thus, it appears that although
CER data from humans are usually a power function of in-
tensity, measures of electrical activity in the afferent
nerves seem to be a logarithmic function.
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There are two interesting aspects of both the animal
and human results. First is the fact that in most of those
studies that have found power functions, the exponents
of the power functions rarely match the corresponding ex-
ponents found by psychophysical methods (see Rosner and
Goff, 1967; Sato, 1971). This discrepancy casts doubt
on Stevens' claim that the value of the psychophysical
exponents refer to end-organ characteristics, because if
they did, they should certainly be represented in the
nervous system. Secondly, if one looks at both the animal
and human data as represented in Tables I and II, there
will be noticed a surprising correspondence between the form
of the intensity function and where in the central ner-
vous system the electrophysiological measure was recorded.
A majority of those studies that have reported logarithmic
functions have recorded from peripheral parte- of the ner-
vous system, while a majority of those that have reported
power functions have recorded from more central parts.
This apparent regularity has led MacKay (1963) to postu-
late that the transduction of energy at the receptor is
logarithmic and that this signal is carried in the afferent
nerves to a central "comparator. 11 Here the signal is
balanced against a centrally generated signal. If this
central signal is also logarithmic, then the result is
an overall power function. Karimont (1962) has also pro-
posed a similar exponentiating mechanism in the CNS which
would transform peripheral logarithmic functions into power
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Table 1 Electrophysiological studies with animals that have
been cited to support either the Fechnerian logari-
thmic law or the Stevensonian power law.
Author (s
)
Electrophys iological Measure Func-tion
Adrian & Matthews
(1927)
spike frequency in optic nerve of eel log
Matthews (1931) spike frequency in frog muscle spindle log
Hartline & Graham
(1932)
spike frequency in nerve fiber from
eccentric cell of Limulus
log
Galarnbos & Davis
(1943)
spike frequency in single auditory
fibers of guinea pig
log
Katz (1950) receptor potential and spike frequency
in muscle spindle of frog
log
Tasaki (195*0 spike frequency in single auditory
fibers of guinea pig
log
Granit (1955) spike frequency in lateral line organ
of eel
log
Rushton (1959) of
the data from
Fourtes (1959)
spike frequency in optic nerve of
Limulus
log
Pfaffman, et al.
(1961)
integrated potentials from: chorda
tyrapani and medulla of rat-
log
Desmedt (1962) massed response of the cochlear nerve
of cat
log
DeValois, et al.
(1962)
spike frequency in single cells in
lateral geniculate of monkey
log
Nomoto. et al.
(1964)
spike frequency in first-order aud-
itory neurons of monkey
log
Yamada (1965) integrated potentials in glass©pharyn-
geal nerve of rabbit and rat
log
Teas, et al.
(196?)
amplitude of action potential in aud-
itory nerve of guinea pig
cower
cont
.
28
Table I (continued)
Author (s
)
Electrophys iological Measure r Line—tion
Mountcastle et al
(1963)
impulse frequency in single neurons in
ventobasal thalamic nuclei of monkey
power
Poggio & Mount-
castle (1963)
impulse frequency in single neurons in
ventrobasal thalamic nuclei of monkey
power
DeValois, et al.
(1965) of earlier
data DeValois
et al. (1962)
spike frequency in single cells in
lateral geniculate of monkey
power
Boudreau (1965) 1 amplitude of action potential in sup-
erior olivary complex of cat
power
Werner & Mount-
castle (1965)
impulse frequency in Iggo touch cor-
puscle axons of monkey
power
Vatter (1966) evoked-potentials in visual cortex
of squirrel
power
Easter (1968) impulse frequency in ganglion cells
of goldfish
power
Dodge, et al.
(1970)
amplitude of generator potsntial in
the eye of Limulus
power
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Table II Electrophysiological studies with humans that have
been cited to support either the Fechnerian logari-
thmic law or the Stevensonian power law.
Author (s
)
Electrophysiological Measure
F Lillw
tion
Borg, et al.
(1967)
summated response in chorda tympani to
salt and sucrose stimulation
log
Keidel & Spreng
(1965)
CER to tone, electric shock, and vi-
bration
power
Ehrenberger, et al
(1966)
GER to vibration power
Loewenich & Fink-
enzeller (196?)
CER to light flashes power
Piatt ig (1967) CER to electrical stimulation of
tongue
power
Davis, et al.
(1968)
CER to tone power
Beck & Rosner
(1968)
CER to electric shock power
Franzen & Offen-
loch (1969)
CER to tactile stimulation power
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functions. Thus, both MacKay's model and Marimonf s model
closely resemble the two-stage models of psychophysical
functioning proposed by Ekman and Treisman and mentioned
earlier. All of these models predict a peripheral log-
arithmic function and a more central power function. As
such, they suggest that Fechner's Law and Stevens' Law
are not mutually exclusive, but that they simply describe
different levels of processing.
Evidence from Response Latency Studies
The last major line of evidence which bears on the
psychophysical laws concerns response latencies to stim-
ulation. Most of this evidence comes from studies of
response latencies (both behavioral and electrophysiologi-
cal) to visual stimulation. Human visual reaction time
has long been known to be a negatively decreasing function
of stimulus intensity (Cattell, 1885; Berger, 1886, Froeberg,
1907, Pieron, 1920). However, as intensity increases,
latency soon reaches an irreducible minimum value. This
asymptotic value presumably represents the minimum dura-
tion necessary for receptor processes, neural conduction,
and efferent processes (Pieron, 1920; Woodworth and Schlos-
berg, 1956; Yaughan, Costa, and Gilden, 1966). The total
reaction time minus the "irreducible minimum" (LQ ) is
known as the "reducible margin" (L-LQ ), and represents
the effect of stimulus intensity on latency. Pieron (1952)
has claimed that the reducible margin is closely related
to subjective brightness, while Vaughan (1966) has extended
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this relationship to conclude that response speed (inverse
of the reducible margin) is directly proportional to bright
ness. As such, the function relating visual latency to
intensity may be used to asess the validity of the psycho-
physical laws.
As reported by Pieron (1952) numerous animal studies
have determined that latency is a negative logarithmic
function of intensity. However, for humans, Liang and
Pieron (19*7), using the Pulfrich effect, have found that
visual latency is a power function of intensity with an
exponent of
-1/3. Bartlett and Maclead (195*0 have dis-
agreed with Pieron. Using simple reaction times, they
found visual latency to be an inverse logarithmic function
of intensity. Pxecently, Vaughan and Hull (1965), Vaughan
(1966), Vaughan, Costa and Gilden (1966) and Mansfield
(1970) have claimed that both simple reaction time and
latency of the visual-evoked cortical potential are power
functions of stimulus intensity, with exponent values of
-1/3. The above visual latency data, coupled with the
report by Luce and Green (1973) that older auditory lan-
ency data (Chocholle, 19^0; McGill, 1963) also seem to
fit power functions, have led to a renewed interest in
the study of reaction times for psychophysical scaling.
In some sense, latency of responding is a rather un-
ique method for scaling sensations. First of all, since
reaction times are assumed to be relatively free of the
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effects of learning, they avoid the criticism that Warren
has raised against many scaling methods; namely, that their
results reflect learned relationships among the stimuli.
Secondly, this response mode affords the advantage of
wide subject applicability and cross-group comparisons.
Unlike either the partition scaling or direct ratio scaling
procedures, the subject need not have a command of the
number system nor any complex cognitive facilities. Thus,
children, retardates, and animals can serve as subjects^
Yet, unlike electrophysiological measures, there is no
difficulty in obtaining data from normal, human, waking
subjects.
This latter point, concerning wide subject applica-
bility, raises an important question. It is a question
about the type of methodology commonly used in human
psychophysics, and more importantly, the type of method-
ology not commonly used.
Human psychophysics had its birth in the midst of
the Structuralist paradigm, when introspection was regarded
as the primary method for investigating "mental elements."
Not surprisingly, therefore, early psychophysicists relied
on methods that were, for the most part, introspect ionist.
With the advent of Behaviorism, most branches of exper-
imental psychology rejected consciousness as an appropri-
ate method of investigation. Psychophysicists, with their
goal of measuring conscious sensation, could not accept
the Behaviorist doctrine and still remain a viable science.
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As a result, human psychophysics had to develop outside
the mainstream of experimental psychology. Though its
methods changed somewhat, it still retained the introspec-
tionist flavor. This is evidenced even by present Steven-
sonian methods of scaling, in which the subject "assigns
numbers in such a way that they reflect his subjective
impressions" (Stevens, 1971, p. 428). Clearly, the task
is one of introspection.
Yet, psychophysics lias, been carried out within the
Behaviorist tradition, although not until fairly recently,
and not with humans, but with animals. Early attempts
at measuring animal sensory processes employed Pavlovian
conditioning techniques (Brown, 1936, 1937). These tech-
niques, coupled with the development of operant condition-
ing procedures and emphasis on "stimulus control of respond-
ing," have led to a branch of experimental learning that,
justifiably, is called "animal psychophysics." This dis-
cipline employs a multitude of scaling methods that parallel
those used in human psychophysics, but obviously, avoid
verbal responses. Some of these, such as stimulus gen-
eralization of responding, conditioned suppression, and
response latency, could readily be applied to human subjects
also. But due to the historical and philosophical schism
between human and animal psychophysics, this has not, in
general, been the case. It is for this reason, also, that
the work on human response latency is important. It is
here that one can begin to develop the link between human
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and animal psychophysical methods, and possibly lead the
way to a more widespread use of these methods in human
psychophysical scaling. In light of the above consider-
ation and those to be discussed below, the present inves-
tigation will be concerned with the use of visual latency
as a method for the scaling of brightness in humans.
>
The Present Investigation H
As has been shown, the method of summing j.n.d.'s
usually produces results that support Fechner's loga-
rithmic law, while the methods of direct ratio scaling
usually produce results that support Stevens' power
law. Other methods, such as partition scaling and el-
ectrophysiological recording produce results that can
support either law, depending on the continuum being
scaled or the physiological level at which the data are
recorded. Response latency methods, although seemingly
germain to the problem, have not been adequately exploited;
and the data that are available have produced conflicting
results.
Visual latency for brightness has been chosen for
a number of reasons. First, brightness is a simple pro-
thetic continuum that has been scaled repeatedly by a num-
ber of different; methods. Thus, comparison of the current
results with other methods is a relatively simple matter.
Secondly, and more importantly, most of the available
data on response latencies have come from studies employing
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visual stimulation, and hopefully, many of the methodolog-
ical problems have been solved. Lastly, those studies
of visual latency which have found a power function of
intensity, have also shown that the value of the exponent
of the function corresponds well with the exponent found
with Stevensonian methods. If one accepts Stevens 1 Law
as an accurate description of the growth of sensation,
then visual latency data is an excellent source for dem-
onstrating "exponent invariance" (Mansfield, 1970).
Before describing the present investigation, it is
necessary to bring out a few particularly important points.
First, most previous studies of visual latency have employed
stimuli of extremely short duration. These stimuli have
sometimes been as short as 10 msec. (Vaughan, et al., 1966).
Thus, most of the durations have fallen well within the
range for which either Bloch's Law or the Broca-Sulzer
effect hold. It is interesting that while many of the
studies that have used short duration stimuli have found
power function relationships, Bartlett and Eaeleod (195*0,
using a much longer duration (575 msecs.), have found a
logarithmic relationship. Since most of the more recent
studies have employed the short stimulus duration, the
present study will re-examine the earlier results of
Bartlett and Kacleod, using a long duration. However,
this study will extend their findings by examining the
effects of long stimulus duration with a light-adapted
subject
.
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Another important point concerns a matter of pro-
per experimental procedure. Most, if not all, of the
studies which have compared response latency functions
with brightness functions have failed to obtain both meas-
ures from the same individual. Usually, response latency
data obtained in one study are compared with brightness
data from another study, using different subjects. This
practice is exemplified in a paper by Luce and Green (1973).
After replotting some early auditory latency data from
Chocholle (19^0) and determining that the latency - inten-
sity function follows a power law, they state, "Since
Chocholle did not obtain magnitude estimates, we have plot-
ted his data as if the magnitude exponent were 0.3." They
then use the linearity between Chocholle' s response latency
data and this "magnitude estimation data" as evidence for
the proportionality between latency and brightness. Clear-
ly they have made two major assumptions. Not only have
they assumed that the brightness function of Chocholle 1 s
subjects would follow a power lav;, but furthermore, that
the values of the exponents of those functions would be
precisely 0.3. Detailed assumptions like these should
not be made, especially in light of the findings by
Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian (1971) that exponent values
for magnitude estimates of apparent size are not well
correlated, even within the same subject, for periods as
short as 2^ hours. It would appear that if one wants to
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demonstrate a relationship between response latency and
brightness, then both measures should be obtained simultan-
eously from the same subject. For this reason the present
investigation will obtain both response latency data and
magnitude estimation data from the same subject and
within a single experimental session. Only one previous
study (Geschieder and Wright, 1971) has employed this
procedure, but in that study, choice reaction times were
used.
The last point to be brought out concerns experiment-
er expectations and their effect on experimental findings.
This point was raised earlier in regard to electrophysio-
logical data. At that time, it was noted that Stevens
(1970a) had attributed early reports of logarithmic functions
to the fact that the physiologists were "expecting them."
However, this criticism can also be applied to many con-
temporary psychophysicists and physiologists, who conclude
that their data were "well fit" by power functions, but
fail to publish any statistical measure of goodness-of-
fit. Yet even when these measures are published, the
"expectation effect" still enters. This is particularly
exemplified by some recent studies of visual latency.
In visual latency studies, the data of concern is
the reducible margin of latencies (L-L ). In order to
o
determine this value, one must interpolate the irreducible
minimum, LQ , from the raw latency data and subtract this
value from the total latency (L). Thus, the value of the
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irreducible minimum can have a sizeable effect cn the func-
tion relating L-LQ to intensity. This factor can be put
to excellent use by an investigator expecting to find
a particular set of results. All he need do is choose
a value of LQ , such that it will improve the fit of the
data to the function he expects to find. Thus, Vaughan,
et al. (1966, p. 650) described their procedure for deter-
mining LQ this way: "We then assessed the adequacy of
power functions for expressing the relation between re-
ducible latency (L-L
o
) and stimulus intensity. The value
of L
o
producing the least residual was accepted as the
best estimate." Likewise, Mansfield (1970, p. 80) makes
the following statement: "The asymptotic latency, L
was chosen to maximize the product
-moment correlation
between the logarithm of those averages (average latencies)
and the energy in the first 10 msec, expressed in decibels."
Clearly, these procedures will produce an inflated value
of the goodness-of-fit for power functions.
The above practice closely resembles one commonly used
for determining 0Q in Equation (9). This procedure was
outlined by Stevens (1961, p. 26) in the following manner:
"Needless to say, the 'effective' threshold (0 ) cannot
o
be measured very precisely. Consequently, it becomes ex-
pedient to take as the value of 0Q the constant value whose
subtraction from the stimulus values succeeds in rectifying
the log-log plot of the magnitude function. Provided the
constant value so chosen is a reasonable threshold value,
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this procedure seems justified." The inherent bias in
both the calculation of LQ and 0Q casts doubt on any
conclusions made concerning the data. Furthermore, the
studies of Vaughan, et al
.
, and of Mansfield, like most
other studies of response latency which have reported
power functions, do not report goodness-of-f it to log-
arithmic functions. It seems to be tacitly assumed that
power functions will give the best fit to the data, and
therefore, the problem is reduced to one of determining
the best fitting form of the power function. For these
reasons, the present research will examine fits of linear,
logarithmic, and power functions to the latency and magni-
tude estimation data by a least square statistic. Further-
more, the asymptotic value of the raw latency data will
be taken as the best estimate of L
,
and the adaptation
intensity will be taken as the best estimate of 0Q . No
further assumptions will be made concerning either LQ or
Experiment 1
Method
Subj ects
Two males and two females (all right-handed) between
the ages of 19 and 29 served as Ss. All were either
graduate or undergraduate students at the University of
Massachusetts and were used in full accordance with the
rules set forth by the Subject Committee of that institution
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and in accordance with the ethical standards maintained
by the American Psychological Association. All Ss
volunteered for participation and received no compen-
sation.
Apparatus
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the
optical and electronic apparatus. An electronic reaction
time clock (Hunter, model 120A) was used to measure the
latency between the onset of the visual stimulus and
the subject's manual release of a telegraph key switch.
Stimulus duration was controlled by an electronic timer
(Hunter, model 111C), and stimulus intensity was varied
by interposing Wratten neutral density filters between
the light source and S. White noise (35dB) produced by
a noise generator (Grason-Stadler, model 455C), was
presented binaurally to S through earphones to mask the
click of the stimulus switch.
The light source was a common incandescent 20-watt
bulb located behind a white presentation panel or reduction
screen. The light from the source projected through an
aperture in the panel and illuminated a white translucent
disk which served as the stimulus. The panel and disk
were located 36 cm from S's eyes, and the stimulus sub-
tended a visual angle of 6°. The stimulus intensities
were 93-^, 85. 1, 76.4, 6?.5 and 60. 7 &B re 10"
10
L (as
measured by a Macbeth Illuminometer)
. The stimulus duration
Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the optical and
electronic apparatus.
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was kept constant at 1.0 sec. The adapting field of the
presentation panel was illuminated by an incandescent source
located behind S, and the adapting intensity of the field
was 60.0 dB re 10"10L.
Procedure
Ss were run for 5 sessions; one session on each of
5 consecutive days. Sessions 1, 2, and 3 were practice ses-
sions, during which S performed only the reaction time
task. Sessions k and 5 were the actual experimental ses-
sions. These two differed only with respect to whether
the reaction time task and magnitude estimation task were
performed together or separately. The session during
which they were performed together will, herein, be called
the "simultaneous" condition. Likewise, the session during
which they were performed separately will, herein, be
called the "successive" condition. For two Ss, the sim-
ultaneous condition was session k- and the successive con-
dition was session 5. For the other two Ss, the conditions
were reversed.
Practice Sessions . S sat at the apparatus and was asked
to read the instructions (see Appendix for these and all
other instructions used in this investigation). After
reading the instructions, S positioned his head in a re-
straint and stared at the adapting field for 10 minutes,
so as to enable stable reaction time measures independent
of adaptation effects. Binocular stimulation and natural
*3
pupils were employed.
Upon a verbal signal from E, S depressed his switch
with his right thumb, and signalled to E that he was
prepared for the stimulus. The stimulus was then pre-
sented from 1 to 3 seconds later, with the length of the
foreperiod distributed, exponentially so as to provide S
with no information as to when the stimulus would occur
(Luce and Green, 1973). After S released his switch, £
recorded the latency and, after waiting the appropriate
time, presented the next stimulus. Stimuli were presented
in a quasi-random order with six presentations of each
stimulus intensity. The interstimulus interval was 30
sees, (plus the interval of the foreperiod). During
this time S continued to light-adapt to the background
field.
Simultaneous Condition
. In this condition, S made magni-
tude estimates of the brightness of the stimulus immediately
after releasing his switch. Thus, both latency measures
and magnitude estimates were recorded on each of the 30 stimu-
lus presentations. No modulus was assigned for the magni-
tude estimates, and all other aspects of the procedure
in this condition were the same as during practice sessions.
Successive Condition
. In this condition, S made magnitude
estimates to the full series of intensities either prior
to or following the reaction time task. Thus, the procedure
in this condition was the same as during practice sessions,
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except that magnitude estimates of the brightness of the
stimuli were obtained independently of the reaction times.
The only other difference between this condition and the
simultaneous condition was that the magnitude estimates
were given for only 2 presentations of each stimulus
intensity. This was done to eliminate the constraints
often put on magnitude estimates by repeated judgings
(Teghtsoonian and Teghtsoonian, 1971; Stevens, 1971).
These constraints could not readily be eliminated in the
simultaneous condition, since a relatively large number
of presentations of each stimulus were necessary to obtain
stable mean values of the reaction times.
Results
Effec
.t of Condition on Reaction Time
Table III shows both the mean and the median reaction
times for each stimulus intensity, subject and condition.
The variance in the data is also shown, as represented
by the standard deviation about the mean or the average
deviation about the median.
It is apparent from this table that the reaction times
in the simultaneous condition were, in general, much long-
er than those in the successive condition. This increase
in reaction time was accompanied by an increase in the
dispersion of the data, as evidenced by the larger values
of the measures of variability. More importantly, though,
the relationship between reaction time and stimulus intensity
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during the simultaneous condition was atypical for at
least two of the Ss. p igures 2 ^ 3 show the general
form of this relationship during both the simultaneous
and successive conditions for all four Ss. it is
quite obvious that during the simultaneous condition,
reaction times were not a negatively accelerated decreas-
ing function of intensity for all Ss. Since these data
were so atypical when compared with previous studies of
reaction time, it was decided not to use the reaction
time data obtained during the simultaneous condition.
It seems that the attempt to simultaneously perform the
reaction time and magnitude estimation tasks introduced
a confounding variable which distorted the reaction times
in a manner independent of intensity. However, it is
interesting that the magnitude estimates in the simultane-
ous condition were not adversely affected, as will be
shown in a later section.
Relationship of Reaction Time to Intensity
Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 show median reaction time plot-
ted against the logarithm of the intensity for each S during
the successive condition. The asymptotic value (LQ ) of
these raw latency data were estimated in order to determine
the reducible margin of latencies, L-L
,
for each S. The
estimated values of LQ were 148, 188, 159, and 161 msec,
for Ss DP, FS, RS, and CM respectively. L-LQ values de-
termined in this way were then plotted against stimulus
intensity, which was specified as the intensity of the
<*7
Figure 2 Median reaction time as a function of stimulus
intensity for all k Ss in the successive condi-
tion. Reaction times have been standardized so
that the longest reaction time for each S is
plotted on the ordinate at 1.0.
o3WI1 N0llDV3a 3AllV13y
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Figure 3 Median reaction time as a function of stimulus
intensity for all 4 Ss in the simultaneous con-
dition e Reaction times have been standardized so
that the longest reaction time for each S is
plotted on the ordinate at 1.0.
3WI1 N0llDV3a 3AliV13y
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Figure 4 Median reaction time as a function of stimulus
intensity for subject DP in the successive con-
dition.

50
Figure 5 Median reaction time as a function of stimulus
intensity for subject PS in the successive con-
dition.

51
Figure 6 Median reaction time as a function of stimulus
intensity for subject RS in the successive con-
dition.
(Dasuj) 3W|1 N0I1DV3M NVIQ3W
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Figure 7 Median reaction time as a function of stimulus
intensity for subject CM in the successive con
dition.
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stimulus minus the adapting intensity, i-i
. Least
square fits of linear, logarithmic, and power functions
to these data were made with the aid of a computer pro-
giam (Danielson, 1968). The coefficient of determination
(r ) for each of these fits is shown in Table IV, along with
the exponent of the best-fitting power function. The co-
efficient of determination was chosen as the measure of good-
ness-of-fit, because this measure also represents the per-
centage of variance explained by the function. For each r2
value, the probability level for getting an r2 value as large
by chance, if no such relationship actually existed was de-
termined by a t statistic (Croxton, 1959, p. 312), and is
also shown in Table IV. Mann-Whitney U tests of the r2 values
presented in Table IV showed that, for the successive condi-
tion, a logarithmic function is a much better description of
the relationship between L-LQ and I-IQ than either a linear
function (p = ,014) or a power function (p = .014).
One interesting aspect of the power functions is that
the exponents range from -.38 to -.40 for all Ss, and that
these values are similar to those found by other investi-
gators (Vaughan, et al., 1966; Mansfield, 1970).
Relationship of Magnitude Estimates to Intensity
Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 show the geometric mean of
the magnitude estimates (ME) plotted against the logarithm
of the intensity for each S during the successive condition.
Again specifying intensity as I-IQ , least square fits of
lineaar, logarithmic, and power functions were made to these
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Figure 8 Geometric mean of magnitude estimates as a
function of stimulus intensity for subject
DP in the successive condition.
S31VWI1S3 3QnilN9VW 30 NV3W Diai3W03O
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Figure 9 Geometric mean of magnitude estimates as a
function of stimulus intensity for subject
FS in the successive condition.

57
Figure 10 Geometric mean of magnitude estimates as a
function of stimulus intensity for subject
RS in the successive condition.
saivwiisa aaniiNOvw do NV3W 3iyi3wo30
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Figure 11 Geometric mean of magnitude estimates as a
function of stimulus intensity for subject
CM in the successive condition.
S31VWI1S3 3anilN9VW dO NV3W Diai3W03O
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data, and the obtained values of r2 and p for each fit
are shown in Table V, along with the exponent of the
best fitting power function. Mann-Whitney U tests of the
2
r values presented in Table V showed that, for the suc-
cessive condition, a power function is a much better
description of the relationship between ME and I-I than
o
a linear function (p = .014), and it is a somewhat better
description than a logarithmic function (p = .057).
Unlike the reaction time data, the magnitude estimates
were not very adversely affected in the simultaneous con-
dition. This is evidenced by the fits of the three functions
to the relationship between ME and I-I for each S during
the simultaneous condition (Table VI). As in the successive
condition, Mann-Whitney U tests of the r2 values showed
that a power function is a much better fit to the relation-
ship than a linear function (p = .029), and it is a some-
what better description than a logarithmic function (p = .2^3)
Furthermore, the exponents for all Ss were correlated across
conditions, with the value of the coefficient of determination
being .9928 (p = .001). It is also noteworthy that the
absolute values of the exponent of the best fitting power
functions ranged between .23 and .31 for three of the four
Ss. These values are similar to those previously found
by direct ratio methods. However, one S, CM, had atypical
exponents of .92 and .75 for the two conditions.
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Bslgtlonship
,
between Reaction Tirr.es and Magnitude Estimates
Since reat ion times were found to be a logarithmic func-
tion of intensity, while magnitude estimates were found to
be a power function of intensity, it followed that reaction
times were not linearly related to magnitude estimates.
Figures 12, 13, lk, and 15 show median reaction time (L-L )
o
plotted against the geometric mean of the magnitude estimates
for each S. The coefficients of determination for the
linearity of these two measures were low, with values
of
.72, .78, .82, and .86.
Experiment 2
Due to the fact that subject CM had very atypical
values for the exponent of the power function relating
ME to I-.I0> it was decided to investigate this point
further. It is known that the brightness exponent increases
with increased light-adaptation (Stevens & Stevens, 1963 ),
but the value rarely approaches that found for subject CM.
To assure that this result was not an outcome of peculiarities
in the methodology, 11 more Ss were run on the magnitude
estimation task only.
Method
Subjects and Apparatus
Ss were from the same population as in Experiment 1,
and the apparatus was the same.
63
Figure 12 Reaction time (L-L0 ) as a function of the geo
metric mean of the magnitude estimates for
each stimulus. The data are for subject DP in
the successive condition.

64
Figure 13 Reaction time (L-LG ) as a function of the geo
metric mean of the magnitude estimates for
each stimulus. The data are for subject FS in
the successive condition.

65
Figure lk Reaction time (L-L0 ) as a function of the geo
metric mean of the magnitude estimates for
each stimulus. The data are for subject RS in
the successive condition.
O u
j 4)
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Figure 15 Reaction time (L-L0 ) as a function of the geo-
metric mean of the magnitude estimates for
each stimulus. The data are for subject CM in
the successive condition.

67
Procedure
^ were run under the same conditions as in the last
two sessions of Experiment 1, except that they did not
Perform the reaction time task. Five Ss gave six magni-
tude estimates for each stimulus intensity, as was the
case in the simultaneous condition. Likewise, six Ss
gave two magnitude estimates for each stimulus intensity,
as was the case in the successive condition. Also, a
second set of instructions which differed slightly from
the first (see Appendix) was given randomly to 4 of the
ll S's.
Results
Table VII summarizes the data for each S. Mann-Whitney U
tests done on the values of r2 showed that a power function
is a much better fit to the relationship between ME and
I-I 0 than either a linear (p = .002) or logarithmic (p = .05)
function, even though two S
s
1 data (Ss 2 and 10) were bet-
ter fit by a logarithmic function. Furthermore, the best
fitting power functions for all Ss had exponent values
which ranged from .25 to A6. The instruction variable
had no obvious effect. Thus, subject CM in Experiment 1
seems to be an anomalous case.
Discussion
Reaction Times During the Simultaneou s Condition .
The disruption of the reaction times in the simultane-
ous condition was a surprising outcome of this research.
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It can be hypothesized that just prior to the onset of
the stimulus, Ss were maitaining two different sets. One.
was a "motor set" for releasing the switch in response
to the onset of the stimulus; the other was a " judgmental
set" for assessing the magnitude of the sensation aroused
by the stimulus. It would seem reasonable, therefore,
to assume that the sets were competing, and the motor set
lost, with the resultant disruption of the reaction times.
This analysis of the situation is based on Ss' verbal re-
ports following the experiment. Subject DP stated, "Be-
fore the light came on I tried to stay prepared to get a
good look at it, so I could judge its brightness." Like-
wise, subject RS stated, "I don't feel as if I was paying
as much attention to my finger as on other days." Both
of these comments support the hypothesis that it was the
presence of these two competing sets which was responsible
for the disruption of the reaction times during the simul-
taneous condition.
Furthermore, it would appear to be difficult to con-
trol this disruptive effect, because some Ss are not
aware of the effect, and others, who are aware of it can-
not seem to control against it. This is evidenced by
the comments of two Ss. Subject FS, whose reaction times
in the simultaneous condition were longer by nearly 300$,
stated that she was completely unaware of any change in
the speed of her reaction times in that condition. Mean-
while, subjects DP and CM, who verbalized the fact that
70
their set to give magnitude estimates may have affected
their reaction times, stated that it was almost impossible
to divorce this set from their preparation for the stimulus
onset. This is surprising in view of the fact that they
knew that the stimulus remained present for some time
following the release of their switch.
.Whether the above analysis in terms of competing sets
is correct or not^.or if it is only one of a number of pos-
sible explanations, is irrelevant. Whatever the explanation,
it is apparent that the reaction times in the simultaneous
condition did not reflect solely a stimulus parameter, i.e.
intensity. For this reason, these reaction times were
not used in subsequent analyses of the data. The failure
to obtain stable reaction times in this condition did not
limit the results of this research, because reaction times
and magnitude estimates to the same stimuli and within
the same subject were recorded in the successive condition.
These measures were recorded within a ^5-60 min. period,
and since it is assumed that these measures are stable
characteristics of the individual, it is not likely that
they would vary greatly within the time span of a single
experimental session. Certainly the fact that both measures
were obtained from the same S is a significant improvement
over earlier studies.
Reaction Time Versus Intensity During the Successive Condition
The finding that reaction times (L-LQ ) are a negative
logarithmic function of stimulus intensity (I-IQ ) confirms
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the earlier results of Bartlett and Macleod (1954) and
extends this relationship to the light-adapted S. it is '
interesting that both their research and the present re-
starch employed a long stimulus duration, 575 and 1000
msec, respectively. Those studies which have employed
very short stimulus durations (Vaughan, 1966; Vaughan,
et al, 1966; Mansfield, 1970) have reported latency data
that are a power function of intensity. Thus, it appears
that latency may be a logarithmic function of intensity
when stimulus duration is long, but a power function of
intensity when stimulus duration is short. No parametric
study of possible changes in the form of latency functions
with changes in stimulus duration has been undertaken,
but such a study would be necessary in a complete analysis
of latency data.
The present results, taken alone, lend support to
Pechner's Law as an accurate description of the relation-
ship between the magnitude of a sensation and the magni-
tude of the stimulus which aroused that sensation. However,
taken together with the results of the magnitude estimation
task (to be discussed below), they suggest support for
Fechner's Law only as a description of peripheral processes.
One interesting aspect of the latency data was that
the fits of power functions, although much poorer than
the fits of logarithmic functions, had exponent values
ranging between -.38 and -.40 for all 4 Ss. These values
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are very similar to those found in previous studies which
have reported power functions (Liang and Pieron, 1947;
Vaughan, et al. f 1966; Mansfield, 1970). Thus, if only
power functions were fit to the present data, the results
might be falsely interpreted as support for Stevens' Law
and as confirmation of previous studies with regard to
exponent values. These data point out the need to use
an objective methodology that avoids the effect of what
Stevens termed "experimenter expectation." This will be
returned to in a later section entitled "Methodological
Considerations."
Magnitude Estimates versus Intensity
The finding that magnitude estimates are a power func-
tion of stimulus intensity (I-IQ ) confirms numerous earlier
studies by Stevens and his collaborators. Thus, taken
alone, these results lend support to Stevens' Law as an
accurate description of the relationship between the magni-
tude of a sensation and the magnitude of the stimulus which
aroused that sensation. However, like the results of the
reaction time data, this conclusion is not totally war-
ranted. Given the above results for reaction times, it
appears that Stevens' Law serves only as a description
of central processes.
The fact that the exponents of the power functions
in both the successive and simultaneous conditions for
three of the four Ss ranged between .23 and .31, also
supports previous findings of a value of about 1/3 . However,
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subject CM's anomalous exponents (.92 and
.75) and the
subsequent results of Experiment 2 raise an interesting
question about the ability of S_s to give numerical pe_
sponses to represent their sensations and the inevita-
bility of a resultant power function. Prom a total of
15 ^ who gave magnitude estimates in Experiments 1 and 2,
the data of 1 3 of them were better fit by a power function.
The other two (both in Experiment 2) were better fit by
a logarithmic function. Huwever, reports of ratio methods,
such as magnitude estimation, resulting in logarighmic
psychophysical functions are extremely rare. In fact,
they are perhaps more rare than one would expect, given
the mathematical similarity between a power function with
an exponent less than 1.0 and a logarithmic function.
Two viable reasons exist for this failure to find
reports of ratio methods which support Fechner's Law.
The first is the fact that most investigators employing
direct ratio methods assume that the resultant data will
be best fit by a power function. Therefore, they do not
bother to try to fit other functions to the data, but go
on to deal with other aspects of the data, such as the
continuum being scaled or the value of the exponent. The
second possible reason is embodied in the "nomathetic
imperative" (Stevens, 1971). This search for the simple
laws governing nature requires the dismissal of occassional
"aberrant" data on the ground that they lead one astray
from the fundamental principles of concern to science.
7^
This attitude is reflected in many of Stevens' writings
and practices. Thus, he writes concerning Ss whose mag-
nitude estimates do not follow a power law: "It appears
that most intelligent, educated people can make these quanti-
tative estimates in a consistent manner, but it is idle to
assume that all people can do so. it is not surprising,
therefore, that an occasional 0 in our experiments turns
out to use numbers in curious ways" (Stevens, 1956, p. 18).
Here Stevens seems to imply that Ss whose data do not follow
a power law must use numbers in an unintelligent or un-
educated manner. Likewise, when he (Stevens, Rogers, and
Herrnstein, 1955) replicated and confirmed the results
of an early scaling experiment (Laird, Taylor and Willie,
1932) which used ratio methods but found results inconsistent
with his own, he simply concluded that that particular pro-
cedure should not be used. Thus, we see the nomathetic
imperative screening both the data and the methods which
are acceptable as evidence for Stevens' Law. The nomathetic
imperative might serve as a valid justification for dis-
missing some data as aberrant, but only if such data occurs
in only a few cases. However, if the data collected in
this investigation is indicative of the entire population,
then the fact that 2 out of 15 Ss » data for magnitude es-
timates were better fit by logarithmic functions, while
one had an exceedingly large exponent, suggests that per-
haps close to 20% of the population use numbers "curiously."
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If this estimate is at all accurate, then it seems well
worth the time to investigate the causes for these depart-
ures from "normality," and not to dismiss them so lightly.
fctjipd^oric^l Consideration
Considering many of the aforementioned practices in
analyzing data from psychophysical experiments, it appears
that the methods of analysis used in such research are of
an importance equal to the empirical findings. Unlike
numerous earlier studies, the present investigation and
the analysis of the data were not guided by an overriding
theoretical assumption. The values of LQ were interpolated
directly from Figs. i*-7, without consideration for a value
which might give a better fit to a particular function.
Likewise, the value of IQ was not chosen post-hoc, but
was assigned the value of the background intensity prior
to any fits of functions to the data. Lastly, linear,
logarithmic, and power functions were all fit to the data with
the coefficient of determination of the least square fit
employed as the measure of goodness-of-f it
. Thus no a
priori assumption about the form of the function was made,
nor was there any ambiguity about what was meant by a "good
fit."
It should be obvious that all of the above practices
are necessary if the conclusions are to be free of the
effect of experimenter expectation. Yet these practices
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appear to have been rarely, if ever, followed. For this
reason, psychophysical studies which exhibit the practices
representative of strong experimenter expectation should
be viewed with care.
IVchneris Law or Stevens' Law
The present investigation has confirmed the validity
of Pechner.s Law when reaction time is used as the response
".ode. Likewise, it has confirmed the validity of Stevens-
Law when numerical magnitude estimation is used as the
response mode. Thesp rpc,,,n 0 -.-.uin e results, rather than being discordant,
are quite consistent, given the great difference in the
forms of the responses. As pointed out by Phillips (196*0,
and cited earlier, they are really quite logically consistent.
Furthermore, these results fit well into various two-stage
models of psychophysical processing.
It will be remembered that Garner (1954), Attneave
(1962), Ekman (196*1), and Treisman (i 96*a f b) have proposed
models in which the psychophysical function can be viewed
as the product of two transformations. The first transduces
the physical energy of the stimulus into a sensation mag-
nitude, and the second transforms this sensation magnitude
into a response magnitude. Garner and Attneave have sug-
gested that both of these transformations are power functions,
while Ekman and Treisman have suggested that the input
function is logarithmic and the output function is expon-
ential. If the input function is associated with character-
istics of physiological processes occurring early jn the
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receptor-effector chain and the output function is associ-
ated with processes occurring later in this chain, then •
the results of the present investigation lend support to
the models of Ekman and Treisman.
On the basis of previous studies (Kuffler, 1953;
Bishop, Eurke, and Davis, 1 962), it has been shown that
visual reaction times are characteristic of the duration
of retinal processes. The results for Ss in the present
investigation indicate that the duration of these peripheral
processes are related logarithmically to stimulus intensity.
As such, they support the contention of a logarithmic in-
put function as proposed by Ekman and Treisman. The fact
that the magnitude estimates of these same S's are related
to intensity by a power function indicates that responses
representative of more central processing undergo a further
transformation. Although it is obvious that magnitude
estimates are not simply transformed latencies, the fact
that they are representative of more central processes
lends descriptive support to the model. A more exact test
of the model would involve the measurement of some variable
that is represented both in the periphery and more centrally.
In general, this limits us to physiological variables; but
as pointed out earlier, such data also support the presence
of a logarithmic function at the periphery and a power
function more centrally.
In conclusion, then, it appears that the controversy
between Fechner's Law and Stevens' Law is really a
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pseudo-controversy. Looking back at Equation U), it is
clear that there are innumerable methods for determining '
the value oh the left-hand side of the equation. Depending
on what type of response is utilized by a given method,
data can be obtained which support either a logarithmic
or a power function. However, the important conclusion
that presents itself is that those methods which utilize
responses representing peripheral processes confirm Pechner's
Law, while those that utilize responses representing central
processes confirm Stevens' Law.
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Appendix
Instrugt lonn, for practice session* and the reaction time
£a_s_k in the succes^vp condition ;
Your task in this exoeriment will be to resocnd as
quickly as possible to a visual signal. On the table be-
fore you is a button. At the start of each trial, the
experimenter will say 'ready?". Upon hearing this, you
are to depress the button with one finger of your right
hand. 3e sure that your hand is resting in a comfortable
position before you start, and be sure to use the same
finger and hand position throughout the exoeriment. When
you are prepared for the visual signal, let the experimente
know by responding •'ready'. Some very short time later
a light will appear in the disc in the center of the pre-
sentation board which is before you. As soon as you see
the light, lift your finger off the button. Soeed is im-
portant, so release the button as quickly as possible to
the onset of the light. After releasing, do no put your
finger back on the button until the next trial (When the
experimenter says •'ready?" again). The signal light will
vary in brightness from trial to trial, so be sure to watch
the disc closely during each trial.
If there are any questions, please asK them now.
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instructions for the ma^Utude ej^maUon task in the
SMC^ssiv^ s^ndition an^ for seven Ss in fetat 2: .
Your task in this part of the experiment will be to
estimate the brightness of lights. You will not need
to operate the button during this time.
As on previous days, each trial will begin with the
experimenter saying "ready?", and you will respond back
"ready" when you are prepared for the signal. When the
light appears you need do nothing but observe it. When
the light goes out, you are to assign a number to the bright-
ness of that light. You may assign any number which you
feel appropriate to the brightness of the first light.
However, be sure to make all subsequent judgments in relation
to the first. That is, if you happen to assign the first
brightness a value of 10, and on the next trial you are
presented a light which appears twice as bright, then you
should call that brightness 20; Likewise, if the second
light appears one-half as bright as the first then you should
call it 5, and so forth. Be sure to make each estimate
in relation to the first, and assign each light a number
proportional to the brightness as you perceive it. You may
use fractions, whole numbers, decimals or anything you feel
comfortable with.
If there are any questions, please ask them now.
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ISgiructiona for the slffiultaneous condition:
*our task in this part of the experiment wm be to
respond as quickly as possibie to a visual signal and then
to estimate the brightness of that signal. The procedure
will be the same as on previous days.
Each trial will begin with the experimenter saying
"ready?". Upon hearing this, you are to depress the button
in the same manner as you have done on previous days
. When
you are prepared for the visual signal, respond by saying
"ready". Some very short time later a light will appear
in the disc in the center of the presentation board. As
soon as you see the light, lift your finger off the button.
Speed is important, so release the button as quickly as pos-
sible to the onset of the light. After releasing the button,
wait for the light to go out. You are then to assign a
number to the brightness of that light. You may assign any
number which you feel appropriate to the brightness of the
first light. However, be sure to make all subsequent judgments
in relation to the first. That is, if you happen to assign a
value of 10 to the brightness of the first light, and on the
next trial you are presented a light which appears twice as I
bright, then you should call that brightness 20; likewise, if it
appears one-half as bright as the first, then you should call
it 5, and so forth. Be sure to make each estimate in relation
to the first, and assign each light a number proportional to
the brightness as you perceive it. You may use fractions,
whole numbers, decimals, or anything you feel comfortable with.
If there are any questions, please ask them now.
Instructions, for. four in Experiment £
You will be presented with a series of stimuli in
irregular order. Your task is to tell how bright they
seem by assigning numbers to them. Call the first stim-
ulus any number that seems to you appropriate. Then
assign successive numbers in such a way that they reflect
your subjective impression. For example, if a stimulus
seems twice as bright, assign a number twice as large
as the first. If it seems one-half as bright, assign a
number one-half as large, and so forth. Use fractions,
whole numbers, or decimals, but make each assignment pro-
portional to the brightness as you perceive it.


